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This Note examines the federal governments authority to prevent U.S. citizens
from re-enteringthecountryaftertravelingabroad.ThisNoteisnotconcernedwith
non-citizenentryintotheUnitedStatesormovementofanypersonswithintheUnited
Statess borders. Additionally, this Note does not seek to explore, in depth, any con-
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Ebola is a deadly disease caused by infection with one of the Ebola virus strains.1
TheWorldHealthOrganizationfirstannouncedthemostrecentEbolaoutbreakon
March23,2014,2 later deeming it the largest and most complex Ebola outbreak










1 About Ebola Virus Disease,CENTERS FOR DISEASECONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov.3,
2015),http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/about.html[http://perma.cc/53K3-JVSW].
2 See Ebola Virus Disease in Guinea,WORLD HEALTH ORG.(Mar.23,2014),http://
www.who.int/csr/don/2014_03_23_ebola/en/[http://perma.cc/F8X5-XLN9];Ebola Virus
Disease in Guinea,WORLD HEALTH ORG.REGIONAL OFF.FOR AFR.(Mar.23,2014),http://
www.afro.who.int/en/clusters-a-programmes/dpc/epidemic-a-pandemic-alert-and-response
/outbreak-news/4063-ebola-hemorrhagic-fever-in-guinea.html[htp:/perma.cc/H2AA-S5WS];





3 Ebola Virus Disease: Fact Sheet No. 103,WORLD HEALTH ORG.,http://www.who.int
/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/#[http://perma.cc/R7JB-NYZY](lastupdatedJan.2016).
4 Id.;see also JeremyAshkenasetal.,How Many Ebola Patients Have Been Treated
Outside of Africa?,N.Y.TIMES,htp://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/31/world/africa
/ebola-virus-outbreak-qa.html(lastupdatedJan.26,2015);AlexandraSifferlin,Heres the
Difference Between MERS and Ebola,TIME(June8,2015),http://www.time.com/3910571
/mers-ebola/[http://perma.cc/L636-QV3G].
5 Questions and Answers: 2014 Ebola Outbreak,CENTERS FOR DISEASECONTROL &
PREVENTION [hereinafterEbola Q&A 1],http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014
-west-africa/qa.html[http://perma.cc/J4LR-W2J7](lastupdatedDec.29,2015).
6 JamesG.Hodge,Jr.etal.,Global Emergency Legal Responses to the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak,42J.L.MED.& ETHICS 595,595(2014).
7 CDCHealthAlertNetwork,Ebola Virus Disease Confirmed in a Traveler to Nigeria,
Two U.S. Healthcare Workers in Liberia,CENTERS FOR DISEASECONTROL & PREVENTION




It also was not a forgone conclusion that Writebols and Brantlys status as U.S. citizens
wouldguaranteetheirreturntothiscountryanditssuperiormedicalfacilities.






tweeted, Stop the EBOLA patients from entering the U.S. Treat them, at the highest




astreatingthem athome.13 Carson also argued that a logical benefit-to-risk analy-
sis favored disallowing re-entry until the threat of transmission had passed.14
A. The Tuberculosis Traveler
FearofcontagiousAmericantravelerscanreadilyturnintoangerandanimosity.
The 2007 debacle surrounding Andrew Speaker, the tuberculosis traveler, is
(July 28,2014,4:30 PM),http://emergency.cdc.gov/han/han00363.asp [http://perma.cc
/AX92-RJQX].
8 See MaggieFox,Docs Declare Ebola Patients Kent Brantly and Nancy Writebol No
Risk to Public,NBC NEWS,http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/docs
-declare-ebola-patients-kent-brantly-nancy-writebol-no-risk-n185626[http://perma.cc/2ZSN
-GUF5](lastupdatedAug.21,2014,3:30PM).
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illustrativeofthepotentialproblemsofre-entry.15SpeakerisaU.S.citizenwhotook
aninternationalflighttoEuropeshortlyafterbeingdiagnosedwithaparticularly
lethalstrainoftuberculosis(TB).16 In January 2007, an X-ray of Speakers ribs
indicatedapossibleTB infection.17AccordingtotheCDC,doctorsrepeatedlytold
Speakerthatheshouldnottravel.18 Aroundthesametime,localhealthofficials




forevaluation.21 The CDC subsequently issued an electronic border alert requiring
borderagentstoisolateSpeakershouldheattempttore-entertheUnitedStates.22
Notwithstanding thisrestriction,Speakermanaged to take severalflightsand











B. The 2014 Ebola Outbreak
Returning to the 2014 Ebola outbreak, a previous version of the CDCs Questions
and Answers on Ebola pamphlet seems to address the consternation surrounding
15 See generally HilaryA.Fallow,Comment,Reforming Federal Quarantine Law in the
Wake of Andrew Speaker: The Tuberculosis Traveler, 25J.CONTEMP.HEALTHL.&POLY
83 (2008) (In the early summer of 2007, the nation was shocked to learn that Andrew Speaker,
athirty-oneyearoldpersonalinjurylawyerfrom Atlanta,Georgia,hadtakenseveralinter-
national flights while infected with a rare and lethal strain of tuberculosis (TB).).









24 See PeterLattman,Tough Times for Andrew Speaker, Esq., and TB Patient,WALL ST.
J.:L.BLOG (Sept.14,2007,3:42PM),http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/14/tough-times-for
-andrew-speaker-esq-and-tb-patient/.
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thedecisiontobringbacktheinfectedAmericans.25 Inthepamphlet,theagency
affirmatively declared that a citizen has the right to return to the United States.26
Thisisaverysimplifiedexplanationofacomplexconstitutionalright.Regardless




more recent CDC pamphlet both chronicles screening protocols and provides for




grants the Surgeon General power to prohibit . . . the introduction of persons . . .




CDCs policies and the relevant statutes make the situation much murkier than the
black-and-white assertion that a citizen has the right to return to the United States.32
Fortunately,the2014Ebolaoutbreaksubsided.33 Thatdoesnotmeanthatthis
issueshouldbeputonthebackburner.Becausethethreatofcommunicablediseases
is certain to be a recurring narrative in the 21st century, it is imperative that our
globalhealthorganizations,worldleaders,andevenourlegalsystemslearnfrom
25 Questions and Answers on Ebola,CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
[hereinafterEbola Q&A 2],http://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/24819/cdc_24819_DS1.pdf[htp:/
perma.cc/GSV9-JSQV](lastupdatedAug.28,2014).
26 Id. (Q: Why were the ill Americans with Ebola brought to the U.S. for treatment?
How is CDC protecting the American public? A: A U.S. citizen has the right to return to
theUnitedStates.AlthoughCDC canuseseveralmeasurestopreventdiseasefrom being
introducedintheUnitedStates,CDC mustbalancethepublichealthrisktootherswiththe
rights of the individual.).
27 Id. (noting that the CDC can use several measures to prevent disease from entering the
UnitedStates,butthatitmustalsobalancethepublichealthriskwiththerightsofindividuals).
28 Compare id. (discussingtherighttore-entryasanabsoluteright),with Ebola Q&A 1,
supra note5.
29 See 42U.S.C.§264(2012);id. §265.
30 Id. §265.
31 See id.
32 Ebola Q&A 2,supra note25;see also 42U.S.C.§265.










II.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THERIGHT TO RE-ENTER
Protectionsfortherighttotravelpredatethiscountryandwerefamiliartoour
earlyEnglishpredecessors.TheMagnaCarta,createdin1215,explicitlyprovided:
It shall be lawful to any person . . . to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely
andsecurely,bylandorbywater,savinghisallegiancetous,unlessitbeintimeof
war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom . . . .36Centuries
of common law decisions have interpreted and sculpted the right to travel abroad a









35 See generally RebeccaA.Weldon,An Urban Legend of Global Proportion: An
Analysis of Nonfiction Accounts of the Ebola Virus,6J.HEALTH COMM.281, 29293 (2001)
(observingthatalarmistdepictionsofthreatsto public health increase ignorance regarding
our biological relationship with our world).
36 MAGNA CARTA,art.XLII (statingthattherighttotraveldescribedinthedocumentis
notabsolute;rather,itmaybecurtailedduringcertainenumeratedexigencieslikewarand
doesnotapplytocertainclassesofpeoplelikeprisonersandoutlaws).
37 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIES ON THELAWS OF ENGLAND 265(George
Sharswooded.,J.B.LippincottCo.1893)(17651769), oll.libertyfund.org/titles/blackstone
-commentaries-on-the-laws-of-england-in-four-books-vol-1 (By the common law, every man
may go out of the realm for whatever cause he pleaseth, without obtaining the kings leave;
provided he is under no injunction of staying at home . . . .).
38 See generally 5Rich.2,stat.1,c.2(1381)(Eng.),reprinted in 2STATUTES OF THE
REALM 18(1816)(declaringastatuteunderwhichthepropertyofmostindividualsbecomes
the property of the king if they leave the realm without the kings permission); see also 4Jac.
1,c.1,§4(1606)(Eng.),reprinted in 4STATUTES OF THEREALM 18(1816)(repealing,after
225years,theaforementioned1381statutewherebyindividualsforfeitedtheirpropertyby
travelingabroadwithoutpermission);JeffreyKahn,International Travel and the Consti-
tution,56UCLA L.REV.271(2008).
39 See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,JR.,THREEHUMAN RIGHTS IN THECONSTITUTION OF 1787,
at 162, 177 (1956) (noting that [b]eyond a few scattered provisions of this sort, the charters
seem to have taken internal freedom of movement for granted).
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laissez-faireattitudetowardtherighttotravelwastheRhodeIslandCharter,which
guaranteed the right to passe and repasse with freedome, into and through the rest
of the English Collonies, vpon their lawfull and civill occasions [sic].40Later,the
revolutionary era brought some restrictions to the colonists ability to travel freely.41
In fact, the restriction of freedom of movement was one of the injuries and usurpa-
tions listed in the Declaration of Independence.42
Given our early legal systems somewhat vacillating approach to protecting the
righttotravelfreely,itisnotentirelysurprisingthattheConstitutionissilentregard-
ingfreedom ofmovement.43 The Constitutions lack of an explicit textual hook for
the right to travel, however, belies the Framers intent to guarantee this freedom. The
course of the Constitutions development highlights several indicia of a desire to
protecttravel.
Forstarters,theArticlesofConfederationexplicitlyaddressedthefreedom to
travel, providing that the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other state.44 Undertheindependentstateschemesetforthbythe
ArticlesofConfederation,thisessentiallyamountedtoprotectionforquasi-interna-
tionaltravel.TheFramersofthe1789Constitutionretainedmuchofthetextsur-
rounding the Articles of Confederations ingress and regress clause, yet declined





40 RHODEISLAND ROYAL CHARTER OF 1663,http://sos.ri.gov/divisions/Civics-And-Educa
tion/charter-1663[http://perma.cc/95TC-4GEL];see also THELIBERTIES OFTHEMASSACHU-
SETTS COLLONIE IN NEW ENGLAND,art.17(1641)http://history.hanover.edu/texts/masslib
.html [http://perma.cc/P355-QDBC] (Every man of orwithinthisJurisdictionshallhavefree
libertie,notwithstandinganyCivillpowertoremovebothhimselfe,andhisfamilieattheir
pleasure out of the same, provided there be no legall impediment to the contrarie [sic].).
41 Kahn,supra note 38, at 28586.
42 Id.
43 CHAFEE,supra note 39, at 18587.
44 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of1781,art.IV,para.1.
45 See CHAFEE,supra note 39, at 185 (The third clause about privileges of trade and
commerce can be regarded as embraced in the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Constitu-
tion repeats the first clause almost verbatim, in Article IV, section 2: The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. But
there is not a trace of the second clause on free ingress and regress . . . .); see also AKHIL
REEDAMAR,AMERICAS CONSTITUTION:ABIOGRAPHY 251(2005)(dismissingtheomission
as merely carving off excess and confusing verbiage).
46 See CHAFEE,supra note 39, at 18687 ([N]obody spoke of barriers . . . against
persons.Verylikelynonehadbeenerected.TheywouldhaveviolatedtheArticlesofCon-
federationandalsowhatI haveassumedtobethelongpracticeinfactduringthecolonial
period. So the silence in the Convention does not seem significant . . . .).
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an explicit textual hook. The omission of the ingress and regress language in the
Constitutionmaybeexplainedbythenotionthatthefreedom ofmovementwas
already considered essential to liberty and did not require specific enumeration.47




















fied.50 By contrast, the right to travel internationally can be considered, at best, an
aspect of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.51ThisNotewillnow focusononlythefreedom ofinternationalmovement
and,inparticular,therighttore-entertheUnitedStates.
47 See, e.g.,THEFEDERALIST NO.84,at537(AlexanderHamilton)(HenryCabotLodge
ed., G.P. Putnams Sons 1895) (1787) ([W]hy declare that things shall not be done which
thereisnopowertodo?Why,forinstance,shoulditbesaidthatthelibertyofthepressshall
not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?).
48 See Kahn,supra note 38, at 286 (The Court granted strong constitutional protections
forinterstatetravel,butpermittedrestrictionofforeigntravelwithinthefarlessprotective
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A. Freedom of Foreign Movement
Moving from the revolutionary era into our nations more recent history, we
havegenerallystrengthenedoursupportfortherighttointernationaltravel.The
freedom to travel and specifically the narrower right of re-entry after having
traveled abroad numbers amongst the rights contained in the 1948 Universal
DeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR).52 TheUDHR,signedbytheUnitedStates
and scores of other nations, contains a provision that [e]veryone has the right to




foundation for the passport cases the most extensive Supreme Court review of the
righttotravelabroad.55














54 22 C.F.R. § 51.136 (1956) (In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the
UnitedStates,passportfacilities,exceptfordirectandimmediatereturntotheUnitedStates,
wilberefusedtoapersonwhenitappearstothesatisfactionoftheSecretaryofStatethatthe










60 Kent, 357 U.S. at 11718.
61 See 22C.F.R.§51.137(1952);Kent,357U.S.at118.
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It is evident from the Courts strong wording in Kent thatfreedom ofmovement




where exactly that right comes from, and the textual source of this right has been
the subject of debate.65 Severaltheoriesforthesourceofthisprotection have
emerged. The prior discussion on the omission of the ingress and regress language
from theConstitutionalludedtooneofthem:substantivedueprocess.Thistheory
willnow beexploredinmoredetail,alongwiththreecompetingtheories.





































country be one that permits balancing the individuals interest in returning against
the governments interest in protecting the majority. Thus, the ideal home for the
rightwillbeonewherethejurisprudenceofthetextualhookfocusesonweighing
andbalancingcompetinginterests.




even if it runs against the individuals right to re-enter the country. Therefore, this
criterionrequiresthattherightbeguaranteedbyaconstitutionalprovisionthatis
non-absolute.Furtherexplanationisnecessary.




66 See supra notes 78 and accompanying text.
67 AlanGewirth,Are There Any Absolute Rights?,31PHIL.Q.1(1981).
68 See, e.g.,id. at2(arguingthattherearecertainabsoluterights).
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rights,thiscriterionsimplyholdsthattherighttore-enterthecountryshouldnotbe


























A. Privileges and Immunities
Thefreedom toreturntothecountrymaybeconsideredaprivilegebelonging
toU.S.citizenspursuanttoArticleIV,Section2oftheConstitution.71 Afterall,
69 See, e.g.,FDA v.Brown& WilliamsonTobaccoCorp.,529U.S.120,133(2000);FTC
v.MandelBros.,359U.S.385,389(1959).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 53031 (1998); United
Statesv.Fausto,484U.S.439,453(1988).
71 U.S.CONST. art IV, § 2 (The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.).




Privileges and Immunities Clause extends to protect [t]he right of a citizen of one
















Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, otherwise known also as the Comity










72 See Kahn,supra note38,at288.
73 Corfieldv.Coryell,6F.Cas.546,552(E.D.Pa.1823)(No.3230).
74 Kahn,supra note38,at303.
75 See id. at287.
76 See JohnHarrison,Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause,101YALEL.J.
1385,1398(1992).
77 Id. at1398.
78 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1 (The better to secure and
perpetuatemutualfriendshipandintercourseamongthepeopleofthedifferentstatesinthis
union[and]thefreeinhabitantsofeachofthesestates...shallbeentitledtoallprivileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several states . . . .).




about Article IV, Section 2 speaks to the right to re-enter. No mutual friendship and














that [a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the
United States.82 Setting aside, for a moment, the privileges or immunities
languagethatfollowsthepassageexcerptedabove,theCitizenshipClausealone
carriesweight.TheFramersoftheFourteenthAmendmentintendedthisclauseto




jettisoned the privileges or immunities language that follows.84
Unfortunately,however,thistextualhomefailsseveralofthecriteriabecause
it would protect the right to travel and the right to re-enter too strongly. If it is
79 Compare U.S.CONST.art.IV,§2,with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of1781,pmbl.
80 See Kahn,supra note 38, at 323 (The right to depart from and reenter ones country
[is] . . . an intrinsic part of what it means to be a citizen of our democratic republic.).
81 See id. at325(notingthatthedistinctionbetweencitizensandsubjectsisadvancedinArti-
cleIII,Section2oftheConstitutionaswelasintheEleventhAmendmenttotheConstitution).
82 U.S.CONST.amend.XIV,§1.
83 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (The para-
mountreason[forpassingtheCitizenshipClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment]was...to
overruleexplicitlytheDred Scott decision.); see also LisaMariaPerez,Note,Citizenship
Denied: The InsularCasesand the Fourteenth Amendment,94VA.L.REV.1029,1054(2008)
(arguingthattheFramersintendedtocodifythecommonlaw doctrineofjus soli).
84 See Kahn,supra note38,at327.





























Although it is not the most obvious candidate, the First Amendments protection
against abridging the freedom of speech87maybetheguarantoroftherighttore-
enter.ThisisaversionofthestancetakenbyJusticeDouglasintwocasesdecided
inconsecutiveterms:Zemel v. Rusk88andAptheker v. Secretary of State.89InZemel,
85 See id. at330.
86 RebeccaE.Zietlow,Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Binghams
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Justice Douglas argued that the right to travel is at the periphery of the First Amend-
ment90andthattheFirstAmendmentprotectstravelasamethodforlearningand




ments goals rather than indirect channels of communication supports Douglass
assertionsthattherighttotravelisprotected,insomeway,bytheFirstAmend-
ment.93 When information in aforeign countryissought,government-imposed












tions on travel that implicate first amendment interests are . . . likely to trigger a





vent a catastrophic and imminent harm to the countrys public health. It cannot be
90 381U.S.at26(Douglas,J.,dissenting).
91 Id. at24.
92 See BarryP.McDonald,The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:





93 See ThomasE.Laursen,Constitutional Protection of Foreign Travel,81COLUM.L.
REV.902,923(1981).
94 Id.
95 See id. at919.
96 381 U.S. at 1617 (For example, the prohibitionofunauthorizedentryintotheWhite
Housediminishes...opportunitiestogatherinformation...butthatdoesnotmakeentry
into the White House a First Amendment right.).
97 Laursen,supra note93,at919.
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saidforcertainwhetherthisrequisiteyieldingwouldoccurhere.Ononehand,the
First Amendments protections are very strong.98 Ontheother,however,theFirst
Amendments protections are not absolute. The freedom of speech and the freedom of
the press may give way when the communication in question is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.99




















andinthelaterZemel case, only one Justice signed on to support Justice Douglass
98 Id.
99 Brandenburgv.Ohio,395U.S.444,447(1969)(percuriam).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 16566 (1965) ([T]he test of belief . . .
iswhetheragivenbeliefthatissincereandmeaningfuloccupiesaplaceinthelifeofits
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God . . . .); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 16267 (1878) (analyzing the meaning of religion and holding that
polygamydoesnotfallunderFirstAmendmentprotections).
101 U.S.CONST.amend.I (Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion,orprohibitingthefreeexercisethereof;orabridgingthefreedom ofspeech,orof
thepress;ortherightofthepeoplepeaceablytoassemble,andtopetitiontheGovernment
for a redress of grievances.).
102 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941) (noting the generally accepted his-
torical belief that one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English common
law on liberty of speech and of the press (quoting Henry Schofield, Freedom of the Press
in the United States,9AM.SOC.SOCY 67,76(1914))).
103 See CHAFEE,supra note 39, at 13.
104 Id.
105 Aptheker v. Secy of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).












D. Substantive Due Process
A fourthpossiblehomefortherighttore-enterisinsubstantivedueprocess
doctrine. The freedom to travel may stem from the word liberty, which is protected
bytheDueProcessClauseoftheFifthAmendment.110 TheDueProcessClause
provides heightened protection against government interference with certain funda-
mental rights and liberty interests.111 Inascertainingwhetheraparticularsubstan-
tiverightisprotectedbytheDueProcessClause,theCourtlookstowhetherthe
proffered right is objectively deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition112





The first three criteria those relating to the strength of the right in various situa-
tions are all met when the right to re-enter is guaranteed through substantive due
process.Oneofthedistinguishingfeaturesofsubstantivedueprocessjurisprudence










115 Cruzan v. Mo. Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
116 See TimothyP.Lydon,Note,If the Parole Board Blunders, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Set the Prisoner Free? Balancing the Liberty Interests of Erroneously Released Prison-
ers,88GEO.L.J.565,567(2000)(describingonetestusedtoresolvesubstantivedueprocess
claims as weighing state interests against an individuals competing . . . liberty interests).
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balancingofcompetingintereststhatiscrucialtosatisfyingthefirstthreecriteria.
Thefirstcriterionismetbecause,inascenariowhereanindividualposesnothreat
to the publics health, the individuals interest in returning will trump any govern-
mentinterestinexcludingthereturn.Thesecondcriterionismetbecause,ifthe
governmentcantakereasonablestepstobringaninfectedcitizenhome,theindivid-
uals interest will outweigh the governments interest and the right will stand. On
theotherhand,ifthemeasuresnecessarytopermitsafere-entryintothecountry
wouldbeunreasonablycostlyorrisky,thegovernmentcouldlegallydenyre-entry.
The third criterion is met because the right will yield and the government will be
able to legally exclude a citizen in cases where the governments interest in pro-

















120 See, e.g.,William Booth,The U.S. Citizenship Test: Learning, and Earning, Their
Stripes,WASH.POST,Nov.17,1996,atC03(statingthattherighttovoteisthecorrectanswer,
for the purposes of citizenship exams, to the question [W]hat is the most important right
granted to United States citizens?);Citizenship Rights and Responsibilities,U.S.CITIZEN-
SHIP& IMMIGR.SERVICES,http://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learners/citizenship-rights-and
-responsibilities[http://perma.cc/D8YB-Q7QR](omittingtherighttointrastate,interstate,
andinternationaltravelfrom alistofrightscompiledtoinform potentialnew citizens).
121 See, e.g.,Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (Until about [1976] . . . the number of right-to
-refuse-treatment decisions was relatively few.); Martha J. Bailey, Mommas Got the Pill:
How Anthony Comstock and Griswoldv.ConnecticutShaped US Childbearing,100AM.
ECON.REV.98,110(2010)(The post-Griswold increase[incontraceptionuse]isconsistent
withtheideathatwomen...wouldhavebeenusingthebirthcontrolpillingreaternumbers
had laws not been so restrictive.).
122 See supra note121andaccompanyingtext.
123 ClaudiaGoldin& LawrenceF.Katz,The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and
Womens Career and Marriage Decisions,110J.POL.ECON. 730, 73235 (2002); see also
Oral Contraceptives: The Liberator,ECONOMIST,Dec.23,1999,http://www.economist.com
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of this rights analysis. There are questions that still need to be answered. Therefore,
thisNotewillnow explorehow therighttore-enterwouldbeanalyzedunderthe
substantivedueprocessdoctrine,inthecontextofdeniedre-entryduetoinfection







124 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 (stating that cases involving the right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment have burgeoned in light of medical advancements, making it possible to sustain life
well past the point where natural forces would have brought certain death in earlier times).
125 See generally Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (upholding the Secretary of States
denialoftraveltoCuba);Kentv.Dulles,357U.S.116(1958)(overturningtheSecretaryof
States decision to refuse passports to alleged communists).
126 See RAYMONDA.AUSROTAS,MIT FLIGHT TRANSP.LAB.,NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT
165654,PREDICTING THEIMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY AIRCRAFT ON INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORTATION DEMAND (1981).
127 See id. at3.
128 See id. at11.
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governmentactions.129Thoseprotectionsaresubstantivedueprocessandprocedural
dueprocess.130 The substantive due process doctrine can be defined as the body of
law produced by thecourtsasthey employ thedueprocessclausesto review
government action on its merits.131Thekeyinquiryinanalyzingasubstantivedue
process claim is whether an asserted right is fundamental.132Thisinquirylargely
hingesonhistoricaltradition.133 A profferedsubstantivedueprocessrightismore




a forward-looking perspective was crucial to the Courts decision in Lawrence v.























([H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the
substantive due process inquiry.).
136 539U.S.558,572(2003).
137 Id. at 572 (relying on the American Law Institutes recommendations, trends in state
laws, and more when examining the nations emerging awareness).
138 478U.S.186(1986).
139 Id. at190.
140 Id. at 19091.
141 Lawrence,539U.S.at578.
142 Id.
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right to return from abroad may have a considerable impact on its analysis as a
substantivedueprocessright.143
Whenanassertedsubstantivedueprocessrightisimplicatedandfoundtobenot
fundamental, the government may infringe upon that right if there is a reason-
able fit between governmental purpose . . . and the means chosen to advance that




be fundamental, the government is not automatically precludedfrom actingina
way that restricts the right; the governments intrusion is permissible provided it is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling [government] interest.146
Applyingboththehistoricaltraditionandemergingawarenessteststotherightto
re-entershowsthatthisrightoughttobeconsideredfundamental.Underthebackward-






diminish the rights importance.150 Participationinglobalaffairsrequires,andhas
alwaysrequired,theabilitytoleavethecountrytoconductbusinesswiththeassur-
ance of ones ability to return thereafter. Moreover, the ability to re-enter the country
bearsonourcapacitytocontinueourmostintimaterelationshipswithfriends,family,
and loved ones. Surely rights protecting those relationships are deeply rooted in
the nations history and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.151
Throughtheforward-lookingperspectiveofwhethertherightissupportedby
an emerging awareness of its importance, the right to re-enter again passes as funda-
mental.Allofthehistoricalconsiderationsareamplifiedbytheincreasedprevalence
143 See, e.g.,id. at558;Bowers,478U.S.at186.
144 Renov.Flores,507U.S.292,305(1993).
145 Id. at 30203 (upholding the government action where the right was determined to not
befundamental).
146 Id. at302.
147 See MAGNA CARTA,art.XLII.
148 THEDECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (1776) (He has endeavoured [sic] to
preventthepopulationoftheseStates;forthatpurposeobstructingtheLawsforNaturaliza-
tionofForeigners;refusingtopassotherstoencouragetheirmigrationshither,andraising
the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.).
149 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of1781,art.IV,para.1.
150 See supra notes 4447.
151 Palkov.Connecticut,302U.S.319,325(1937);see also Bowersv.Hardwick,478
U.S.186,214(1986).
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right to re-enter the country should qualify as fundamental, there is finally a
formulathatcanbeusedtoanalyzegovernmentrestrictionsonthisrightinthe
contextofcommunicablediseases.Thehistoricaltraditionoftherightaswellas
forward-looking considerations indicate that the right is a fundamental right for
thepurposesofsubstantivedueprocess.Accordingly,thegovernmentshouldbe
justifiedinpreventingaU.S.citizenfrom re-enteringthecountryonlywheredoing











casesinto the fundamentalsubstantive due processrightframework produces
desirableresults,thenthesamedesirableresultsshouldbeexpectedinthecontext
ofcommunicablediseasecases.
A. Testing the Formula: Applying Substantive Due Process to the No Fly List
ThroughtheNoFlyList,theFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)andother
government agencies can utterly shut down a persons ability to return to the United
States.AlthoughtheNoFlyListisactuallymaintainedbytheTransportationSecurity
Administration (TSA), the names on the list are largely compiled from classified
evidence collected by confidential sources.155 Severalagenciesworktogetherto





155 JustinFlorence,Note,Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due Process Model for Terrorist
Watchlists,115YALEL.J.2148,2155(2006).
156 Id.





communicablediseasepurposes.159 Under 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3), the TSA may use
informationfrom governmentagenciestoidentifyindividualsonpassengerlistswho
may be a threat to civil aviation or national security.160Onceanindividualisidentified
as a threat, the TSA may prevent the individual from boarding an aircraft, or take
other appropriate action.161Theeffectstriggeredbyplacementonthelistcancause




March 2009, he temporarily left the United States to learn Arabic and connect with
members of his family living abroad.164 Whileoverseas,hetraveledtoYemen,
Somalia,andKuwaitwithoutanytrouble.165 MohamedallegedthatinDecember





States.169 Mohamed wasneithercharged nordetained upon hisarrivalhome.170
MohamedthenfiledanactionagainsttheAttorneyGeneral,thedirectoroftheFBI,
andthedirectoroftheTSC.171Inhiscomplaint,heallegedthathisplacementonthe
NoFlyListviolatedhisconstitutionalrights.172 Specifically, he aleged a violation of
his right as a U.S. citizen to reside in the United States and reenter it from abroad.173
157 Id. at2154.
158 Id. at2153.













172 Id. at 52425.
173 Id. at524.











to fulfil the governments interest. The first step in testing the narrowly tailored
prongistoexaminethelengthoftimeduringwhichtherightwasdenied.Here,the





re-entry was over-inclusive in Mohameds specific case because he in fact did not
poseathreattonationalsecurity.176 The third step for the purposes of the narrowly













governments actions were narrowly tailored. However, one factor clearly sug-
gests a finding of no impermissible deprivation of Mohameds right to re-enter. That
factoristhelengthoftimeduringwhichhisrighttore-enterwasdenied.Thus,the
bestconclusiontodraw from theformulaisthatthegovernmentactionwasnotan
impermissible curtailment of Mohameds right. This predicted result can now be
comparedtotheactualresultofMohamed.
174 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 21819 (1944) (upholding the
internmentofJapaneseAmericansduringWorldWarII).
175 Mohamed, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 52324.
176 Id. at523(explainingthatMohamedwasstudyingArabicandvisitingfamily).








dants and held that [a]t some point, governmental actions taken to prevent or
impede a citizen from reaching the boarder [sic] infringe upon the citizens right to






to a constitutionally unacceptable violation of Mohameds right to re-entry.182 [T]he
fourtofive-daydelaythatMohamedexperiencedinhisabilitytoreentertheUnited
Statesdidnotundulyburdenhisrightofreentryandtherefore,asamatteroflaw,
did not constitute a constitutional deprivation.183Thepredictedresultmatchesthe
actual result. Additionally, the predicted result turned on the length of Mohameds
denial, and that consideration of time also seemed to be crucial to the courts deci-
sion.Inthiscase,theformulapassesmuster.
B. More Data Supporting No Fly List Cases
Othercourtshad theopportunitytoaddressfactpatternssimilarto thatin














185 Id. at 127374.
186 Id. at1276.
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andprotocolstoassistUnitedStatescitizenstoreturntotheirhomelandwho,once




nameappearedontheNoFlyList.189 In other words, it is not necessary for Plaintiff











necessary.193Usingthisrequirement,theFikre court dismissed the plaintiffs claim,
findingthattheplaintiffcouldhavegonetotheembassyoverseastoattemptto
securepassagebacktotheUnitedStates.194














192 Id. ([T]o plead a substantive due-process claim based on a deprivation of the right to
returntotheUnitedStates,PlaintiffmustallegefactssufficienttodemonstratethatDefendants























































restricting a persons re-entry into the United States are the containment of commu-
nicablediseasesandthepreventionofterrorism.Pursuanttoanumberofdisconcert-

























eate the permissible length of a given travel restriction adopted either through statutes
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statethatthelengthoftherestrictionissimplytheincubationperiodforthedisease.
Thiswouldassistcourtsinperformingthesubstantivedueprocessbalancingtestby
signalingwhatconstitutesapermissibledelayandwhatconstitutesanimpermissible
delay.Additionaly,suchabright-linerulewouldtelthoseindividualswhosere-entry
hasbeenrestricted,thelengthoftimethattheywillhavetowaitbeforereturning
home.Perhapsmostimportantly,additionalclarityintherighttore-enterwouldgive
bothassurancetopeopleliketheEbolamissionariesandunderstandingtoconcerned
citizensbackhome.
